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Abstract— During human-robot interaction (HRI), we want the
robot to understand us, and we want to intuitively understand
the robot. In order to communicate with and understand the
robot, we can leverage interactions, where the human and robot
observe each other’s behavior. However, it is not always clear
how the human and robot should interpret these actions: a given
interaction might mean several different things. Within today’s
state-of-the-art, the robot assigns a single interaction strategy to
the human, and learns from or teaches the human according
to this fixed strategy. Instead, we here recognize that different
users interact in different ways, and so one size does not fit all.
Therefore, we argue that the robot should maintain a distribution
over the possible human interaction strategies, and then infer how
each individual end-user interacts during the task. We formally
define learning and teaching when the robot is uncertain about
the human’s interaction strategy, and derive solutions to both
problems using Bayesian inference. In examples and a benchmark
simulation, we show that our personalized approach outperforms
standard methods that maintain a fixed interaction strategy.
Index Terms— Cognitive Human-Robot Interaction; Learning
from Demonstration; Human Factors and Human-in-the-Loop
I. INTRODUCTION
Human-robot interaction (HRI) provides an opportunity for
the human and robot to exchange information. The robot can
learn from the human by observing their behavior [1], or teach
the human through its own actions [2]. In applications such as
autonomous cars, personal robots, and collaborative assembly,
fluent human-robot communication is often necessary.
In order to learn from and teach with interactions, however,
the human and robot must correctly interpret the meaning of
each other’s behavior. Consider an autonomous car following
behind a human driven car. If the human car slows down, what
should the robotic car infer: is the human teaching the robot to
also slow down, or signaling that the robot should pass? When
learning from an end-user, the robot needs a model of that end-
user’s teaching strategy, i.e., how the human’s actions relate
to the information that human wants to convey. Conversely,
when teaching the end-user, the robot must model that end-
user’s learning strategy, i.e., how the human interprets the
robot’s actions. Together, we define the end-user’s teaching
and learning strategies as their interaction strategy.
In the state-of-the-art, the robot assigns a pre-programmed,
fixed interaction strategy to every human; each individual end-
user is assumed to teach or learn in the same way. Instead:
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We here recognize that different users have different
interaction strategies, and we should infer the current
end-user’s interaction strategy based on their actions.
Rather than a single fixed estimate of the human’s interaction
strategy, we argue that the robot should maintain a distribution
(i.e., belief) over the possible human interaction strategies, and
update this belief during the task. By reasoning over this belief,
the robot can adapt to everyday end-users, instead of requiring
each human to comply with its single pre-defined strategy.
Overall, we make the following contributions:
Learning and Teaching with Strategy Uncertainty. We
introduce and formulate two novel problems in human-robot
interaction, where the robot must optimally communicate with
the human, but the robot is unsure about how the current end-
user teaches or learns.
Solution with Bayesian Inference. We derive methods for the
robot to learn and teach under strategy uncertainty. We show
that—when the robot does not know the end-user’s interaction
strategy—optimal solutions infer and update a belief over that
interaction strategy, resulting in personalized interactions.
Simulated Comparison to Current Methods. Using didactic
examples and an inverse reinforcement learning simulation, we
compare our proposed approach to robots that reason over a
fixed interaction strategy. We also consider practical challenges
such as noisy and unmodeled interaction strategies.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Robots Learning from Humans
When a human expert is using interactions to teach a robot,
the robot can leverage learning from demonstration (LfD) to
understand how it should behave [1]. Most similar to our
setting is inverse reinforcement learning (IRL), an instance of
LfD where the robot learns the correct reward function from
human demonstrations [3], [4]. Prior works on IRL generally
assume that every human has a single, fixed teaching strategy
[5]: the human teaches by providing optimal demonstrations,
and any sub-optimal human behavior is interpreted as noise
[6]–[9]. Alternatively, robots can also learn about the human
while learning from that human. In Nikolaidis et al. [10], for
instance, the robot learns about the end-user’s adaptability in
addition to their reward function. Building on these works, we
will infer the end-user’s teaching strategy, so that the robot can
more accurately learn from human interactions.
B. Robots Teaching Humans
Machine teaching—also known as algorithmic teaching—
identifies the best way for an expert robot to teach the novice
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2human [2]. In order to teach optimally, however, the robot
must know how the human learns. Recent machine teaching
works [11]–[13] have addressed this problem by using human
feedback to resolve mismatches between the assumed human
learning strategy and the user’s actual learning strategy. Most
related to our research is work by Huang et al. [14], which
compares the performance of different models of human learn-
ing. These authors generated the optimal teaching examples
for each proposed learning strategy, and then used human
feedback to identify the single best teaching strategy across
all users. Like Huang et al. [14], we here reason over multiple
learning strategies, but now we want to infer each user’s
specific learning strategy based on their individual responses.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a human who is interacting with a robot. In this
setting, both the human and the robot are agents. Let us assume
that one of these agents has a target model, θ∗ ∈ Θ, which
they want to teach to the other agent. Here Θ is the space of
possible target models, and θ∗ is particular behavior that the
teacher wants to convey to the learner. For example, the teacher
may want to show the learner a better way to complete the
current task, or communicate how it will interact in the future.
We are interested in how the robot should behave when it is
(a) learning θ∗ from or (b) teaching θ∗ to a human agent.
A. Notation
Let us denote the robot state as x. The human takes action
u, and the robot takes action a; these actions and the state
x are observed by both the robot and the human. We use
a superscript t to denote the current timestep, so that xt is
the state at time t, and x0:t is the sequence of states from
the start of the task to the current time t. In the context of
supervised learning, we can think of x as the input features,
and u and a as the output labels assigned by the human and
robot, respectively [15]. Here Θ is a hypothesis space, and θ∗
defines the correct mapping from features to labels.
B. Learning from the Human
When the human is the expert—i.e., the human knows θ∗,
but the robot does not—the robot should learn from the human.
The human wants to teach the robot θ∗, and has a teaching
strategy φ∗, which determines what actions the human selects
to convey θ∗ to the robot. More formally, a teaching strategy
φ ∈ Φ relates the setting (x, θ) to the human action u:
pi(u | x, θ, φ) (1)
Here pi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the human will take
action u given x, θ, and φ. We point out that (1) is also the
human’s policy when teaching the robot, and that this policy
is parameterized by φ. In other words, if the robot knows
the teaching strategy φ∗, then it can leverage (1) to correctly
interpret the meaning behind the human’s actions.
In practice, however, the robot does not know what teaching
strategy an end-user will employ. Hence, we argue that the
robot should maintain a probability distribution over φ as it
learns from the human. We refer to this problem of learning
from the end-user when uncertain about their teaching strategy
as learning with strategy uncertainty:
Definition 1: (Learning with Strategy Uncertainty). Given
a discrete or continuous set of possible teaching strategies Φ
and target models Θ, infer an optimal estimate of θ∗ based on
the history of states x0:t and human actions u0:t.
C. Teaching the Human
Next we consider the opposite situation, where the robot is
the expert, and is trying to teach θ∗ to the human. Here the
human agent has some learning strategy ψ∗, which determines
how the human interprets the robot’s actions a. A learning
strategy ψ ∈ Ψ expresses the relationship (from the human’s
perspective) between the setting (x, θ) and the robot action a:
pi(a | x, θ, ψ) (2)
In the above, pi is the human’s model of the robot’s policy—
not necessarily the robot’s actual policy—and this model is
parameterized by ψ. So now, if the robot knows the user’s true
learning strategy ψ∗, the robot can leverage (2) to anticipate
how its actions will alter the human’s understanding of θ∗.
But, when teaching an actual end-user, the robot does not
know what learning strategy that specific user has. Similar to
before, we therefore argue that the robot should maintain a
distribution over the learning strategies ψ when teaching the
human. We refer to this problem, where the robot is teaching
a user but is unsure about that end-user’s learning strategy, as
teaching with strategy uncertainty:
Definition 2: (Teaching with Strategy Uncertainty). Given
a discrete or continuous set of possible learning strategies Ψ
and target models Θ, select the robot action at that optimally
teaches θ∗ based on the history of states x0:t, robot actions
a0:t−1, and human actions u0:t.
D. Assumptions
Throughout this work, we will assume that the interaction
strategies φ∗ and ψ∗ for each individual user are constant,
and are not affected by the robot’s behavior. Put another way,
the robot cannot influence the human’s interaction strategy
by selecting different actions. This assumption is consistent
with prior HRI research [2], [5]: however, we can also extend
our proposed approach to address cases where the human’s
interaction strategy does change by incorporating a forgetting
factor or transition model within the Bayesian inference.
IV. ROBOT LEARNING WITH STRATEGY UNCERTAINTY
Within this section we focus on learning from the human,
where the robot does not initially know the human’s teaching
strategy φ∗. Learning here is challenging, because the robot is
uncertain about how to interpret the human’s actions. First, we
demonstrate how the robot can learn from multiple models of
the human’s teaching strategy. Second, we enable the robot to
update its joint distribution over φ and θ, and simultaneously
learn both the human’s teaching strategy and target model.
We provide an example which compares learning this joint
distribution to learning with a single fixed estimate of φ∗.
3A. Multiple Teaching Strategies
The robot starts with a prior b0(θ) over what θ∗ is, and
updates that belief at every timestep t based on the observed
states and actions. The robot’s belief over target models is:
bt+1(θ) = P (θ | u0:t, x0:t) (3)
In other words, bt+1(θ) is the probability that θ = θ∗ given the
history of observed states and human actions up to timestep t.
Applying Bayes’ rule, and recalling from (1) that the human’s
actions u are conditionally independent, the robot’s Bayesian
belief update becomes [16]:
bt+1(θ) =
bt(θ) · P (ut | xt; θ)∫
Θ
bt(ξ) · P (ut | xt; ξ) dξ (4)
We here used a semicolon to separate the observed variables
from the hidden variables. The denominator—which integrates
over all possible target models—is a normalizing constant.
Omitting this constant, we can more succinctly write (4) as:
bt+1(θ) ∝ bt(θ) · P (ut | xt; θ) (5)
where P (u | x; θ) is the robot’s observation model, i.e., the
likelihood that the human takes action u given x and θ.
To correctly learn from the end-user, the robot needs an
accurate observation model. We saw in Section III-B that the
most accurate observation model is the user’s policy pi, which
is parameterized by the true teaching strategy φ∗. Within the
state-of-the-art, the robot often assumes that the user’s policy
is parameterized by φ0, where φ0 is some estimate of φ∗ :
P (ut | xt; θ) = pi(ut | xt; θ, φ0 ) (6)
Rather than a constant point estimate of the human’s teaching
strategy, we argue that the robot should maintain a belief over
multiple teaching strategies. In the simplest case, the robot has
a prior b0(φ) over what φ∗ is, but does not update this belief
between timesteps. Here the observation model becomes:
P (ut | xt; θ) =
∫
Φ
pi(ut | xt; θ, φ) · b0(φ) dφ (7)
Note that (6) is a special case of (7) where b0(φ0 ) = 1. When
learning with (7), the robot does not interpret human actions
in the context of just one teaching strategy. Instead, the robot
considers what the action u implies for each possible teaching
strategy, and then learns across these strategies. We can think
of (7) as the best fixed learning strategy when b0 is known.
B. Inferring a Joint Belief
Now that we have introduced learning with multiple teach-
ing strategies, we can solve learning with strategy uncertainty
(Definition 1). Here we not only want to learn the target model
θ∗, but we also recognize that the robot is uncertain about φ∗.
Let us define the robot’s joint belief b(θ, φ) over the target
models θ ∈ Θ and teaching strategies φ ∈ Φ to be:
bt+1(θ, φ) = P (θ, φ | u0:t, x0:t) (8)
Again leveraging Bayes’ rule and conditional independence:
bt+1(θ, φ) ∝ bt(θ, φ) · P (ut | xt; θ, φ) (9)
short long𝜃*𝜙*
Fig. 1. A human and robot are interacting to sort screws of different lengths.
The human teacher indicates one screw that they consider short (highlighted),
and then the robot learner sorts the screws into the short and long boxes. The
robot does not know which screws are short a priori, and also does not know
the end-user’s teaching strategy. For instance, the human could be indicating a
short screw at random, or purposely selecting the longest of the short screws.
where P (u | x; θ, φ) is the conditional probability of human
action u given x, θ, and φ. But this is the same as (1), so that:
bt+1(θ, φ) ∝ bt(θ, φ) · pi(ut | xt; θ, φ) (10)
Using (10), we learn about both the human’s target model and
the human’s teaching strategy from x0:t and u0:t.
Let us compare the observation model for this joint learning
rule to the observation models from (6) and (7). If we rewrite
(10) into the form of (5), we obtain the observation model:
P (ut | xt; θ) =
∫
Φ
pi(ut | xt; θ, φ) · bt(φ | θ) dφ (11)
where the belief over teaching strategies given θ is:
bt(φ | θ) = P (φ | u0:t−1, x0:t−1; θ) (12)
Intuitively, a robot implementing (11) and (12) reasons across
multiple teaching strategies when learning from the end-user,
and also updates its belief over these teaching strategies every
timestep. We find that the observation model (7) is a special
case of (11) when the robot never updates b0(φ | θ) = b0(φ),
i.e., if the robot’s belief over teaching strategies is constant.
Accordingly, (6) is a special case of (11) by extension. Our
analysis shows that inferring a joint belief over θ and φ both
generalizes prior work and is an optimal learning rule.
C. Learning Example
To demonstrate how the proposed observation models affect
the robot’s learning, we here provide an example simulation.
Consider the sorting task in Fig. 1, where the robot is at-
tempting to learn the right threshold classifier from the human.
At each timestep t, the human action u indicates one screw
that should be classified as short; the robot then classifies the
remaining screws without additional guidance. Let θ∗ be the
correct decision boundary, and let the robot’s reward equal the
total number of screws classified correctly. We can think of
this example as an instance of inverse reinforcement learning
[4], where the robot learns the true objective θ∗.
Importantly, we include two different teaching strategies
φ ∈ Φ that the human might use. Within the first strategy, φ1,
the human noisily indicates the short screw closest to θ∗, so
that pi(φ1) ∝ exp{− 12 · |θ∗ − u|}. Within the second strategy,
φ2, the user indicates a short screw uniformly at random,
so that pi(φ2) ∝ 0.9 if u ≤ θ∗ or pi(φ2) ∝ 0.1 otherwise.
Each end-user leverages one of these two teaching strategies;
however, the robot does not know which.
4Fig. 2. Learning when uncertain about the human’s teaching strategy. Here
two teaching strategies are equally likely. Left: number of screws incorrectly
sorted after a single interaction. Right: number of screws incorrectly sorted
after t interactions. Maintaining a distribution over both teaching strategies
results in more optimal robot behavior than always assuming one strategy.
Notice that Prior and Joint are equal when t = 1. Error bars indicate SEM.
Fig. 3. Learning when one human teaching strategy is more likely. Left:
70% of humans use teaching strategy φ1. Right: 90% of humans use φ1, but
the robot incorrectly believes both strategies are equally likely a priori, i.e.,
b0(φ1) = 0.5. Even when the robot’s prior is wrong, learning with strategy
uncertainty (Joint) leads to better performance over time than assuming φ1.
Observation Models. We compare (6), (7), and (11). Let φ1
denote a robot that learns with (6), and assumes φ1 = φ∗
for all users. Similarly, φ2 is a robot that assumes φ2 = φ∗.
Prior denotes a robot with observation model (7), and Joint
leverages our proposed approach (11). Finally, φ∗ is an ideal
robot that knows the teaching strategy for each individual user.
Simulation. At timestep t the robot observes the action ut and
updates its belief bt+1(θ) with (5). Next, the robot optimally
sorts 10 screws based on its current belief [8]. At timestep
t+ 1 the task is repeated with the same end-user (who has a
constant θ∗ and φ∗). The results of these simulations averaged
across 105 end-users are shown in Figs. 2 and 3.
Analysis. Using our proposed Joint observation model resulted
in fewer errors than learning under φ1, φ2, or Prior. With
Joint the robot was able to personalize its learning strategy
to the current end-user across multiple iterations, and more
accurately learn what the user was communicating (see Fig. 2).
As expected, Prior outperformed other fixed strategies when
b0 was correct; however, if the robot did not have an accurate
prior over teaching strategies, the Prior observation model (7)
was less optimal than φ1 (see Fig. 3, right). We found that
our proposed approach was robust to this practical challenge:
despite having the wrong prior, Joint still caused the robot’s
behavior to converge to the ideal learner, φ∗.
V. ROBOT TEACHING WITH STRATEGY UNCERTAINTY
Within this section we consider the opposite problem, where
the expert robot is teaching the human about θ∗, but does
not know the end-user’s learning strategy ψ∗. Teaching here
is challenging because the robot is not certain what the user
will learn from its actions. We first outline a specific instance
of robot teaching, where the human learns through Bayesian
inference. Next, we demonstrate how the robot can teach
with multiple models of the human’s learning strategy, and
derive one solution to teaching with strategy uncertainty. In
a simulated example, we compare these methods to robots
that teach with a constant point estimate of ψ∗. We also
describe how the robot can trade-off between teaching θ∗ to
and learning ψ∗ from the human via active teaching.
A. Teaching Bayesian Humans
Similar to previous works in machine teaching [14], [17]
and cognitive science [18], [19], we assume that the human
learns by performing Bayesian updates. Thus, the human’s
belief over the target models after robot action at becomes:
bt+1(θ) =
bt(θ) · pi(at | xt; θ;ψ∗)
Z(ψ∗)
(13)
where we use ; to denote that the human observes ψ∗ but not
θ∗. The denominator is again the normalizing constant:
Z(ψ) =
∫
Θ
bt(ξ) · pi(at | xt; ξ;ψ) dξ (14)
We point out that pi in (13) and (14) is (2), the policy that the
human assigns to the robot. The human interprets the robot’s
actions—and updates its belief—based on this policy, which is
parameterized by the human’s true learning strategy ψ∗. Here
bt is also the state of the human at timestep t, and (13) defines
the state dynamics (i.e., the human’s transition function).
The robot should select actions so that this state transitions
to b(θ∗) = 1. Let us define the ideal robot action as:
at = arg max
a
bt+1(θ∗) (15)
where at will greedily maximize the human’s belief in θ∗ at
the subsequent timestep. The human takes an action ut based
on what they have previously learned; the human actions are
therefore observations on the human’s state, i.e., ut = h(bt).
For example, the human’s action could be completing a test
about the target models, or performing the task themselves.
Here we consider the simplest case, where:
ut = h(bt) = bt (16)
Hence, the human feedback ut provides their actual belief over
the target models at the current timestep. The robot observes
the human state bt from (16), and selects action at with (15)
to shift the human towards the desired state bt+1.
B. Multiple Learning Strategies
Consider cases where the robot is teaching this Bayesian
human, but does not know the human’s learning strategy ψ∗.
When ψ∗ (and therefore the future state bt+1) is unknown,
teaching is analogous to controlling an agent with unknown
state dynamics [20]. Define bˆ as the robot’s prediction of the
human’s state given the history of actions and world states:
bˆt+1(θ) = P (θ | u0:t, a0:t, x0:t) (17)
5Since the human performs Bayesian inference (13), and re-
calling that the robot observes bt(θ), we equivalently have:
bˆt+1(θ) =
∫
Ψ
ut(θ) · pi(at | xt; θ, ψ)
Z(ψ)
· bt(ψ) dψ (18)
Within the above, b(ψ) is the robot’s belief over the human’s
learning strategies. For the state-of-the-art, the robot estimates
the human’s learning strategy as ψ0, so that (18) reduces to:
bˆt+1(θ) =
ut(θ) · pi(at | xt; θ, ψ0)
Z(ψ0)
(19)
Instead, we here argue that the robot should teach with a belief
over multiple learning strategies. Let b0(ψ) be the prior over
what ψ∗ is. If the robot never updates this initial belief, then
the predicted human state after action at becomes:
bˆt+1(θ) =
∫
Ψ
ut(θ) · pi(at | xt; θ, ψ)
Z(ψ)
· b0(ψ) dψ (20)
Comparing (20) to (19), now the robot reasons about how
its actions are interpreted by each learning strategy. When
selecting the action at with (15)—where we replace bt+1 with
prediction bˆt+1—this robot teaches across multiple strategies.
C. Inferring the Learning Strategy
Because the robot is getting feedback from the user, how-
ever, we can also infer that specific user’s learning strategy,
ψ∗. Learning about ψ∗ provides a solution to teaching with
strategy uncertainty (Definition 2), and results in robots that
adapt their teaching to match the human. Let us formally
define the robot’s belief over learning strategies as:
bt(ψ) = P (ψ | u0:t, a0:t, x0:t) (21)
We use the subscript t instead of t+ 1 since bt(ψ) does not
actually depend on at, as we will show. Applying Bayes’ rule:
bt(ψ) ∝ P (u0:t | a0:t, x0:t;ψ) · P (ψ | a0:t, x0:t) (22)
Recalling that the human’s learning strategy is not altered by
the robot, P (ψ | a0:t, x0:t) = P (ψ). Moreover, because the
human is a Bayesian learner, and ut = bt, here ut depends on
ut−1, at−1, xt−1, and ψ (13). Hence, (22) simplifies to:
bt(ψ) ∝ bt−1(ψ) · P
[
ut
∣∣∣∣ ut−1 · pi(at−1 | xt−1; θ, ψ)Z(ψ)
]
(23)
Intuitively, (23) claims that the belief over learning strategies is
updated based on the differences between the human’s actual
state (left side of the likelihood function) and the predicted
human state given ψ (right side of the likelihood function)1.
By observing u, we can use (23) to infer the human’s learning
strategy. By then substituting (23) back into (18), the robot
learns about ψ∗ while teaching the human θ∗ : thus, using
(18) with (23) addresses teaching with strategy uncertainty.
D. Teaching Example
Here we provide an illustration of how reasoning over mul-
tiple learning models can improve teaching with uncertainty.
1We used Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [21] to define the likelihood
of ut given the right side of (23), but other options are possible.
plate
cup𝜃*
𝜓*
Fig. 4. A robot is moving towards a goal position, and is trying to convey that
goal to the human. Here the robot teacher is moving to the plate, θ∗, but does
not know the human’s learning strategy, ψ∗. For example, the human may
learn best from goal-directed trajectories (solid) or exaggerated trajectories
(dashed). When the robot teacher reasons over each of these human learning
strategies, it selects an action that teaches both types of learners (highlighted).
As shown in Fig. 4, the robot is moving towards goal position
θ∗, and wants to teach that goal to the nearby human. At each
timestep t, the robot’s action a is an incomplete trajectory
(e.g., see the three trajectory segments in Fig. 4). After
observing this robot trajectory, the human updates their belief
over θ∗ ; specifically, the human applies Bayesian inference to
determine whether the robot’s goal is the cup or the plate. The
robot uses (15) with prediction bˆt+1 to select the trajectory a
which will teach the human the most about θ∗.
We consider two possible learning strategies ψ ∈ Ψ for the
simulated end-users. Humans with ψ1 learn best from legible
(i.e., exaggerated) trajectories [22]: pi(ψ1) = (0.1, 0.3, 0.45)
if the robot moves directly towards θ, slightly exaggerates, or
fully exaggerates, respectively. By contrast, under ψ2 the user
learns best from predictable (i.e., goal-directed) trajectories,
such that pi(ψ2) = (0.35, 0.2, 0.15) if the robot moves directly
towards θ, slightly exaggerates, or exaggerates, respectively.
The robot does not know which strategy a given user selects.
Prediction Method. We compare (18), (19), and (20). Let
ψ1 denote a robot which predicts that every user learns with
(19), where ψ0 = ψ1. Likewise, ψ2 is a robot that estimates
ψ0 = ψ2. The Prior robot reasons over both learning strategies
using (20), and our proposed Learn robot solves teaching with
strategy uncertainty by leveraging (18) with (23).
Simulation. The robot observes the human action u—i.e., the
human’s current belief—and selects an action a using (15) and
its prediction method. The robot can select between 6 different
legible or goal-directed trajectory segments (3 for each goal
θ). The human is a Bayesian learner. Our results (averaged
across 105 simulated users) are depicted in Figs. 5 and 6.
Analysis. Robots using our proposed Learn approach more
quickly taught θ∗ than with the fixed teaching methods ψ1,
ψ2, or Prior. Reasoning over human learning strategies led to
better teaching during a single interaction (see Fig. 5). For
multiple iterations, we tested practical scenarios where the
robot has the wrong prior: in every case, Learn yielded the
fastest convergence, and taught as well as the ideal teacher
after ≈ 5 timesteps (see Fig. 6). Intuitively, the Learn robot
gradually shifted to teaching with either legible or predictable
trajectories, while the Prior robot continued to compromise
between both strategies instead of adapting to the specific user.
E. Active Teaching
Like we saw in the previous example, learning about the
human’s learning strategy ψ∗ can improve the robot’s teaching.
6Fig. 5. Teaching when uncertain about the human’s learning strategy. Left:
the human’s confidence that the robot’s goal is θ∗ after one interaction. When
using Prior or Learn, the robot selects a slightly exaggerated trajectory, which
teaches both groups of learners. Right: the human’s belief after t iterations.
When the robot reasons about a distribution over learning strategies, it teaches
θ∗ more quickly than when focusing on a single type of learner (ψ1 and ψ2).
Fig. 6. Teaching when one learning strategy is more likely. Left: the robot
knows that 80% of users learn with ψ1, and so the Prior robot greedily selects
legible actions (Prior= ψ1). Right: the robot initially thinks both strategies are
equally likely, but 70% of users have ψ2. Learning about ψ∗ while teaching
θ∗ (Learn) outperforms ψ2 over time, even with the wrong prior.
Hence, we here focus on selecting robot actions which actively
gather information about ψ∗, so that the robot more quickly
adapts its teaching to the end-user. Let us formulate teaching
with strategy uncertainty as a partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP) [16]: the state is
(
bt(θ), θ∗, ψ∗
)
,
the action is (at, xt), the observation is ut, the state transitions
with (13)—where θ∗ and ψ∗ are constant—the observation
model is (23), and the reward is bt(θ∗). Solving this POMDP
causes the robot to optimally trade-off between exploring for
more information about ψ∗ and exploiting that information to
maximize the human’s belief in θ∗. When solving this POMDP
is intractable, we can more simply perform active teaching by
favoring actions that gather information about ψ∗ [23]:
at = arg max
a
{
bt+1(θ∗)− λ ·H(bt+1(ψ))} (24)
In the above, λ ≥ 0, and H is the Shannon entropy. Comparing
(24) to (15), now the robot selects actions to disambiguate be-
tween the possible learning strategies (i.e., reduce the entropy
of the robot’s belief over ψ). Intuitively, we expect a robot that
is actively teaching with (24) to select actions, a, which cause
users with different learning strategies to respond in different
ways, allowing that robot to more easily infer ψ∗.
VI. ROBOT LEARNING SIMULATIONS
To compare our learning with strategy uncertainty against
the state-of-the-art in a realistic problem setting, we performed
a simulated user study. We here consider an instance of
inverse reinforcement learning (IRL): the human demonstrates
a policy, and the robot attempts to infer the human’s reward
function from that demonstrated policy [3]–[5]. Unlike the
example in Section IV-C, now θ∗ (the human’s reward pa-
rameters) and φ∗ (the human’s demonstration strategy) lie in
continuous spaces. We compared robots that learn θ∗ with a
constant point estimate of φ∗ to our proposed method, where
the robot learns about both θ∗ and φ∗ from the human. To
test the robustness of our method within more complex and
challenging scenarios, we also introduced noisy end-users,
who did not follow any of the modeled teaching strategies.
A. Setup and Simulated Users
Within each simulation the human and robot were given an
8-by-8 gridworld (64 states). The state reward, R(x, θ), is the
linear combination of state features f(x) weighted by θ, so
that R(x, θ) = θ · f(x). The human knows θ∗, and provides a
demonstration pi(u | x, θ∗, φ∗). This demonstration is a policy,
where the human labels each state x with action u; actions
deterministically move in one of the four cardinal directions.
The discount factor—which defines the relative importance of
future and current rewards—was fixed at γ = 0.9.
Our setting is based upon previous IRL works [5], where
this problem is more formally introduced as a Markov decision
process (MDP). These prior works typically assume that the
human’s demonstrated policy approximately solves the MDP,
i.e., maximizes the expected sum of discounted rewards [8],
[9]. By contrast, we here considered users with a spectrum
of demonstration strategies. Let Q(x, u, θ) be the reward for
taking action u in state x, and then following the optimal
policy for reward parameters θ. We define the probability that
the simulated user takes action u given x, θ∗, and φ∗ as:
pi ∝ exp
{
α
[
Q(x, u, θ∗) +φ∗
(
R(x′, θ∗)−R(x, θ∗))]} (25)
where φ∗ ∈ [−1, 1], and x′ is the state reached after taking
action u in state x. When φ∗ = 0, (25) is the same as the
observation model from [8], [9]. As φ∗ → +1, the human
biases their demonstration towards states that have locally
higher rewards; conversely, when φ∗ → −1, the human favors
states with lower rewards. Sample user demonstrations with
different teaching strategies are shown in Fig. 7.
B. Independent Variables
We compared four different approaches for learning θ∗ from
the user’s demonstration: φ∗, φ = −1, φ = +1, and Joint.
Under φ∗ the ideal robot knows the human’s true teaching
strategy, while φ = −1 and φ = +1 indicate robots which
assume that the human’s demonstration is biased towards low-
reward or high-reward states, respectively. Joint refers to a
robot which attempts to learn both φ∗ and θ∗ from the human’s
demonstration, as discussed in Section IV-B.
To see how these approaches scale with the length of the
feature vector, f ∈ F , we performed simulations with |F | = 4,
8, and 16 features. In practice, each state x was randomly
assigned a feature vector with |F | binary values, indicating
which features were present in that particular gridworld state.
Finally, to test how well the robot learned when the human
demonstrations were imperfect, we varied the value of α in
7Fig. 7. Sample 8-by-8 gridworld labeled by two different simulated users.
Both users have the same reward parameters θ∗, and the grid cells are colored
based on this reward (lighter cells have higher reward). The optimal policy for
θ∗ is shown by the darker arrows. Left: the human leverages teaching strategy
φ∗ = −1, and teaches the robot by biasing their demonstration to highlight
low-reward states. Right: this user instead uses teaching strategy φ∗ = +1,
and favors states with locally higher reward. The robot attempts to learn θ∗
given a demonstration (like the ones shown above), but does not know φ∗.
(25). Parameter α represents how close to optimal the human
is: as α→ 0, the human becomes increasingly random, while
the human always chooses the best action when α→∞.
We simulated 100 users for each combination of |F | and α,
where the users’ teaching strategies were uniformly distributed
in the continuous interval φ∗ ∈ [−1, 1]. The gridworld and θ∗
were randomly generated for each individual user.
C. Dependent Measures
For each simulation we measured the robot’s learning per-
formance in terms of Reward Error, Strategy Error, and Policy
Loss. Reward Error is the difference between the robot’s mean
estimate of θ∗ and the correct reward parameters: ‖θ∗ − θˆ‖1.
Similarly, Strategy Error is the error between the robot’s mean
estimate of φ∗ and the user’s actual teaching strategy: |φ∗−φˆ|.
Policy Loss measures how much reward is lost by following the
robot’s learned policy (which maximizes reward under θˆ ) as
compared to the optimal policy for θ∗ [8]. The code for our ex-
amples and simulations can be found at https://github.
com/dylanplosey/iact_strategy_learning.
D. Results and Discussion
We performed a mixed ANOVA with the number of features
and value of α as between-subjects factors, and the learning
approach as a within-subjects factor, for both Policy Loss and
Reward Error (see Figs. 8 and 9). Since we found a statistically
significant interaction for both dependent measures (p < .05),
we next determined the simple main effects.
Simple main effects analysis showed that Joint resulted in
significantly less Policy Loss than either φ = −1 or φ = +1
for each different combination of |F | and α (p < .05). We
similarly found that Joint resulted in significantly less Reward
Error (p < .001) for every case except |F | = 16, α = 5;
here there was no statistically significant difference between
Joint and φ = +1 (p = .498). These results from Figs. 8 and
9 suggest that learning while maintaining a distribution over
φ results in objectively better performance than learning with
a fixed point estimate of φ∗.
Next, we investigated how well the Joint method learned the
individual users’ teaching strategies. We performed a two-way
ANOVA to find the effects of |F | and α on the Joint robot’s
Strategy Error (see Fig. 10). We found that the number of
features (F (2, 891) = 23.813, p < .001) and the human’s α
(F (2, 891) = 22.679, p < .001) had a significant main effect.
Post-hoc analysis with Tukey HSD revealed that |F | = 16
and α = 20 led to significantly higher Strategy Error than the
other values of |F | and α, respectively. As shown in Fig. 10,
the robot had larger Strategy Error for higher values of α
because it was unable to distinguish between teachers with
φ∗ > 0; i.e., these different teachers provided similar policy
demonstrations when α = 20.
Finally, we conducted a followup simulation in which we
introduced unmodeled noise (see Fig. 11). Here |F | = 8
and α = 10, but we now increased the ratio of the human
taking completely random actions, which were not modeled
in (25). Joint resulted in significantly less Policy Loss than
φ = −1 or φ = +1, even as the ratio of unmodeled user
noise increased. Hence, reasoning over multiple strategies still
improved performance for cases where the noisy end-user did
not comply with any of the modeled teaching strategies.
E. Challenges and Limitations
Although this simulated user-study supports learning with
strategy uncertainty, there are still practical challenges that
may limit our proposed approach. In particular, the end-user’s
actual interactions may not match any of the learning or
teaching models, such that φ∗ /∈ Φ or ψ∗ /∈ Ψ. Having
the wrong hypothesis space is often unavoidable when using
models to learn from humans: but, as we show in Fig. 11, our
proposed approach does remain robust to some errors in the
hypothesis space (such as noisy users, that do not follow any
of the included models). In practice, designers could leverage
data from previous trials to construct a richer space of possible
interaction strategies, so that Φ is updated to include φ∗.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because the human’s interaction strategy during HRI varies
from end-user to end-user, robots that assume a fixed, pre-
defined interaction strategy may result in inefficient, confusing
interactions. Thus, we proposed that the robot should main-
tain a distribution over the human interaction strategies, and
exchange information while reasoning over this distribution.
We here introduced robot (a) learning with strategy uncer-
tainty and (b) teaching with strategy uncertainty, and derived
solutions to both novel problems. We performed learning
and teaching examples—as well as learning simulations—
and compared our approach to the state-of-the-art. Unlike
standard approaches that assume every user interacts in the
same way, we found that attempting to infer each individual
end-user’s interaction strategy led to improved robot learning
and teaching, while remaining robust to unmodeled strategies.
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